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In a 2016 American Political Science Review article, Vincent Munoz distinguished two different
approaches to thinking about religious liberty issues. In that article, Munoz distinguished between

what he labeled as the Founders’ “natural rights free exercise constitutionalism” and “modern
autonomy exemptionism.”1 Munoz writes that the dominant approach of courts toward religious
liberty in the last fifty years or longer is that “individuals and institutions deserve
exemptions…from generally applicable laws that burden sincerely held religious beliefs and
exercises.”2 This approach Munoz calls moral autonomy exceptionalism. The other approach,
which Munoz claims was adopted by the American Founders, begins with a recognition that
everyone has a natural right (grounded in a creator and nature itself) to religious freedom, and this
right lies beyond the state’s direct prohibition or regulation.3 In actual practice this would translate
into a recognition that all humans have this natural right of religious liberty, but “all matters
pertaining to religion are not part of the natural right.”4 Nevertheless, if the particular claim fell
within the sphere or jurisdiction of the proper meaning and scope of religion, it is not balanceable
with other alleged state interests and must be allowed. The right of free exercise itself has natural
limits, but it did not “evolve, grow, or change over time.”5
Munoz’s claim has been disputed, on both originalist and non-originalist grounds. This paper
will therefore attempt to discern (1) a definition common for religion in the Founding era and (2)
the original scope and meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. However, even if I am unable to
determine precisely these meanings in their original context or in the debates surrounding them, a
case can still be made that a “natural rights” approach may be more accurate than a moral
autonomy approach. To put it another way, a non-balancing approach may be a better one than
the current balancing approach.
At the outset as well, as Vincent Munoz has characterized the basic attitudes of those giving
religion a special status in the American system, “[T]he Frist Amendment’s text, whatever the
Establishment Clause might mean, clearly gives special status to the ‘free exercise’ of religion.6
After all it is specifically mentioned as a right among a relatively few other rights in the
Constitution. It was placed at the beginning of the United States Constitution, as it had been in
state constitutions, and it was (and is) mentioned as a “first liberty,” not only in syntactical order
but in priority. Moreover, religion itself has always been of first importance in all civilizations,
precisely because it is about ultimate meaning and ultimate things.
Definition of Religion in the Founding Era
It will be important to understand the best we can the definition of the term “religion” in the
eighteenth century, particularly in America but also in other Western European nations. If we
know how religion was understood, we are better able to determine the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause. What interferes in a relevant way with religious belief or practice marks the limit of
government interference. But defining religion and its scope marks the limit of a claim of religious
liberty.
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Beginning with a broad understanding of the concept in the Enlightenment (c. 1650-1800),
Peter Harrison writes that we began to see religious pluralism at the time of the Reformation, but
pluralism did mot yet lead to toleration, much less a “natural right” of religious liberty.7
Nevertheless, it did sow the seeds of new ideas about what constitutes religion. During most of
the Reformation, if one deviated from the accepted tradition, whether Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist
or Anabaptist, one was considered to hold to a different religion. The Peace of Augsburg (1555)
and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) granted a stunted for of toleration, and the French Edict of
Nantes (1598) actually decreed toleration of two religious groups—Catholic and Calvinists—until
1675. But other belief systems, Deism, Antitrinitarianism, Dualism, for example, were heresies.
Islam, Judaism, and other non-Western forms of religion were simply outside the religious pale,
even though tolerated off and on.
It was not until the 1600s that we see the beginnings of writing about a form of toleration that
went beyond narrow limits, and even talk about religious liberty as some sort of conscience right.
The English clergyman Roger Williams, writing before John Locke, argued that it is “the will and
command of God [that since the coming of Christ] a permission of the most Paganish, Jewish,
Turkish or Antichristian consciences and worships, bee granted to all men.”8 It is evident that
religion is being conceived much more broadly than before. This view seems to be quite close
to one that would be accepted today, with the exception that atheism and agnosticism are not
mentioned.9 A few decades later, John Locke, in his famous Letter Concerning Toleration,
included under the umbrella of toleration and “civil rights” “Presbyterians, Independents,
Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers and others…. Nay if we openly speak the Truth and as
becomesone Man to another; neither Pagan, nor Mahumetan [Muslim], nor Jew ought to be
excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, because of his Religion.”10 Locke does
except from toleration Roman Catholics, mainly because he considers the Catholic Church
politically subversive. He also continues to use the language of the Reformation in asserting that
“We are to enquire therefore, what men are of the same Religion….it is manifest that those who
have not the same Rule of Faith and Worship, are of different Religions. Turks and Christians are
of different Religions….”11 Locke distinguishes different religions but he grants rights and
toleration to nearly all. Moreover, he classifies all of them as religions. I would argue that
Catholicism is an anomaly peculiar to Locke because of his specific historical context. With this
reading then, we can argue that religion in the late seventeenth century was understood broadly.
However we still must address some of the newer developments such as Atheism, Rational
Dissent and Deism. When did these traditions gain the status of religions? Or did they before the
ratification of the Bill of Rights? Deism is a notoriously slippery and contested term. Harrison
defines Deism as “the extreme manifestation of the rationalising tendency within the religious
thought of seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England.”12 Deists held a variety of views
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on theological subjects and did not always espouse ideas we attribute to deism. This definition of
deism would apply as well to Continental Europe with only slight variations. Deism was certainly
considered a kind of religion, albeit a problematic one criticized by traditional Catholics and
Protestants. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin have often been labeled as deists, though
the attribution is contested by some.13 Franklin called himself a deist, while Jefferson used the
term to describe others, including Jesus. I believe therefore that deism would be comprehended
under the term “religion” at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
Atheism too was used as a pejorative term to cover many unorthodox belief systems in the
eighteenth century, for example, freethought, pantheism and skepticism. Thomas Hobbes had
been called an atheist in the seventeenth century because of his alleged philosophical materialism.
According to Harrison, “’Atheism’ in the seventeenth century had retained many of the
connotations which it had acquired in classical antiquity. Atheists in both eras included those who
denied the force of arguments which were regarded as supporting theism, or who proposed nonreligious theories of the origins of religion.”14 Atheism therefore appears to have been a
philosophical denial of certain doctrines that make God a viable entity (immortality, eternal
punishment, etc.), but seldom an outright denial of the existence of any deity, even if that thought
was called atheistic.15 At any rate, atheism in its later philosophical form was, if one can even find
it, a serious challenge. But how did it fare in relation to religious liberty? That question would
become even more important as we enter the twentieth century: Would atheism be included under
the term “religion” as understood by the First Amendment?
If we go back to John Locke, “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God.
Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon
an Atheist.”16 Such a philosophy therefore could not in England in the late 1600s, be protected
from government oppression or even persecution, as no right would exist. Thomas Jefferson, who
was considerably influenced by Locke, drafted “A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” for
the new state of Virginia in 1779, which stated in part:
“SECTION I. Well aware that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their own will, but
involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds, that Almighty God hath created the mind
free;…that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments…or civil incapacitations, tend
only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness…that the opinions of men are not the object of
civil government, nor under its jurisdiction…no man shall be compelled to [to attend or support
any church]…nor molested…that all men shall be free to profess…and maintain, their opinions in
matters of religion…and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil
capacities.”17
The wording of this statute still begs the question regarding Jefferson’s or the general view of
atheism. Jefferson later wrote in his Notes on the State of Virginia (1782, printed in 1784) that
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“But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god.”18 James
Madison argued for freedom of religion (more than toleration) using much the same wording as
Jefferson.19 However, Madison has left us comparatively little to enable any conclusions on his
view of atheism. Taking Madison and Jefferson together, we may conclude that atheism is an
unresolved problem for originalists, and possibly even problematic. According to Michael
Paulsen, the best originalist connotation of the meaning of religion in the Free Exercise clause is a
set of beliefs closely aligned with theism (including deism).20 Paulsen may be correct, but his
conclusion is debatable. I will therefore put aside atheism for the time being and assume the term
religion includes at least all theistic belief systems.
The Bill of Rights and the Free Exercise Clause
It may be possible to get at the intent of Congress and official state sentiments regarding
religious liberty we examine briefly the bills of rights in state constitutions and the Northwest
Ordinance (1787). But to do this, we are required to add to the list of concepts to be defined, those
of “free exercise” (or similar phrases) and that of how the Founders envisioned this right of
religious liberty to be interpreted in practice. As I move into the following section, the latter
problem will become all-important. If religious liberty is a natural right, made civil by the
Constitution, what are its limits and how exactly are they to be determined by judges?
The Northwest Ordinance states: “No person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly
manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments in the
said territory….”21 Religion likely here excludes atheism, but does include other non-Christian
religions. The practice of liberty is limited, as expected, by the requirement of non-violence, or
possibly, any practice that might undermine morals (though the scope of the phrase seems narrower
than that).
The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), drafted by George Mason and modified at the
insistence of James Madison, reads in part: “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion…; and that it it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love and charity
towards eachother.”22 This provision is nearly identical with Madison’s Remonstrance.
Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1776 provides a unique perspective. Article II begins, “That all
men have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences and understanding….Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a
God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious
sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no authority…assumed by any
power…that shall interfere with, or…control the right of conscience in the free exercise of
religious worship….”23 What strands out here is the obvious limits on who is granted religious
liberty and who is not. The language is limited to those “who worship Almighty God” and who
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acknowledge “the being of a God.” Everyone else does not have any religion. But all who do
confess some deity are granted this right. Atheism is excluded. This fairly stark statement seems,
as we will see, to capture the Founders’ sentiments and definitely the sentiments of many state
governments.24
Clearly beliefs in some deity are protected from interference by a religious liberty right. But
the term “exercise” in the Constitution itself would tell us that at least certain actions related to
religious beliefs are also protected. This problematic term will become crucial in the discussion
of the appropriate test to be used to adjudicate a free exercise right.
The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, after it was proposed, went through several
modifications in Congress. The progression in proposals might provide illumination as to the
intended meaning at the time. But one can draw a couple of preliminary conclusions. First, the
language of religious liberty is not at all self-evident, but it does also seem to be absolutist and
therefore very broad in its scope. The fact that the language is somewhat vague would become the
very foundation for the struggle by courts to find some workable test.
The Bill of Rights was proposed after the Anti-Federalists (and others) objected to its absence
in the Constitution itself. Richard Henry Lee’s suggestion in 1787 is simply that “the right of
Conscience in matters of religion shall not be violated.”25 The Ratifying Convention of
Pennsylvania requested an explicit addition to the Constitution: “The right of conscience shall be
held inviolable” with following language intended to prevent the national government from
infringing on the states’ “preservation of liberty in matters of religion.”26 The Maryland Ratifying
Convention’s proposed amendment was also brief: “…that all persons be equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty.”27 Finally, Virginia proposed that “all men have an equal,
natural and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of
conscience,….”28 New York, North Carolina and Rhode Island used language nearly identical to
Virginia’s.
These proposed additions to a Bill of Rights, as I mentioned above, were very broad and
absolutist in their tenor. Of course no right is absolute, as it must contain some implicit or explicit
limit to its scope. Such limits are sometimes determined by the language used. In these cases, the
term “religion” and “conscience” are initially controlling of scope. Whatever falls under religion
and religious conscience is the first and “outer” limit of the scope or extensiveness of the right of
religious liberty. But that still leaves a massive conceptual territory that likely was not intended
to be so large. The language of any liberty is not unlimited either theoretically or as applied to any
given individual. It seems obvious to assert that the inner limit of any liberty includes the point at
which the liberty (right) or any one individual infringes in some relevant way on others’ rights.
This and other factors are heavily dependent in turn on definitions of terms as well as historical
and philosophical contexts. If we wish then to grasp the concept of religious liberty in order to
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arrive at a useful test for its application, we must consider contexts and the entire notion of the
structure of rights.29
When we come to the Congressional debates on the Bill of Rights, we can find a variety of
wording. In one of his first acts in Congress, James Madison, as he promised, gave a speech
introducing a bill of rights (among other modifications). He stated that “The civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship…”30 Madsion did recognize arguments
that a bill of rights was unnecessary on account of the limited enumerated powers of the Congress.
But he also feared that the “Necessary and Proper Clause” might provide an opening for
government overreach and the denial of what would be rights.31 Rights needed to be clearly
defined against the legislature and against a majority of the people. The free exercise of religion,
in belief and practice, therefore was specified, though as with other statements, its limits and scope
were not defined.
A Draft Proposal from the House Committee suggested the following form: “The people have
certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society, Such are the rights
of Conscience in matters of religion…”32 Is it plausible that since the right mentioned was called
a “natural right,” that it preceded government, and that it is mentioned first, that it might be a
fundamental right with an extremely broad scope preventing state interference? I am suggesting
this possibility tentatively, but in historical context it makes good sense. How wide a scope the
right was intended to be is not defined specifically. But it might certainly be broader that later
Supreme Court interpretations. And it was intended to be broader by the Founders, as evidenced
by Phillip Munoz and Philip Hamburger in their respective articles.33
The House Committee Report and House Debate began with a substantially shortened version
of a religious freedom clause, stating simply, that “the equal rights of conscience” be infringed. 34
The debate itself was divided between those who believed a religion clause was unnecessary or
harmful and those who agreed with it but quibbled over the precise wording. Madison stated that
“he apprehended the meaning of the words [proposed] to be, that Congress not…enforce the legal
observation [of religion or worship] by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience.”35 The House resolution included the following wording: “Congress
shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of Conscience be
infringed.”36 In the Senate, the religion clause was winnowed down from more expansive
language that, for example, “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion….”37 The final wording in Conference
29
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Committee became the religion clauses of the First Amendment (except for replacement of an “a”
with a “the”). With the twentieth century, the Free Exercise Clause was applied by the Supreme
Court to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.38
My tentative conclusion is that the Congress limited the term “religion” to any sect or to any
traditional non-Christian religion (Judaism, Islam) and that the protection of beliefs was an
absolute given while actions related to worship limited the scope of freedom of religion. However,
I have detected sentiment for the protection of liberty outside the traditional sphere of worship as
well. At least the wording of some of the proposals and other communications were broad in
scope. In addition, the fact that the final version of the Free Exercise Clause was not limited to
worship-related activities, as it had been in some earlier versions and proposals. There was no
limiting language at all, unless one takes the view that anyone of this era would have understood
the clause as limited to worship alone. Assuming a broad scope then, we still have not established
a distinct boundary for actions—indeed, I am not convinced that is possible with precision.
Both Munoz and Hamburger point out the Founders “distinguished between civil protections
for natural and non-natural or acquired rights.”39 As Munoz continues, “The failure to appreciate
the Founders’ distinctions between natural and non-natural rights has led some to conclude that
the Founders limited religious freedom only to Christians or even just to Protestants.”40 As I have
argued, the early state constitutions for the most part used fairly inclusive language, as did various
Founding Fathers such as Jefferson and Madison.
The Founders then believed that religious liberty was not only a natural right, but was also an
unalienable right. According to Munoz, understanding the idea of inalienability is a key part of
understanding why the Founders believed religion to be special.41 We begin with the natural rights
social contract theory of the Founders. The first principle is that all men are by nature free and
equal.42 James Wilson elaborates: “But however great the variety and inequality of men may be
with regard to virtue, talents, taste, and acquirements; there is still one aspect, in which all men in
society, previous to civil government, are equal….The rights and duties man belong equally to
all….previous to civil government (the “state of nature”), all men are equal.”43 Natural rights give
individuals freedom to act as they wish (within limits of natural law) and an immunity from others
who would prevent them from acting. Individuals therefore may or may not exercise religion.
Legitimate political authority is constituted to protect those natural rights.44 Political authority
exists both to protect natural rights from government and to prevent individuals from infringing
on others’ natural rights. Humans consent to enter into a social contract for those purposes. But
some authority is not and cannot be given up to government, namely inalienable rights. Various
Founders viewed religious beliefs and actions as immune from state interference. The duty owed
by every person is to deity or their conception of ultimate meaning in life. Thus it cannot be granted
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to government and it cannot be coerced by government. James Madison furthermore extends free
exercise protection to believers and unbelievers.45
If this interpretation is correct, then Vincent Munoz is also correct is arguing that “judges lack
authority to balance the inalienable elements of the natural right of religious liberty against other
state interests.”46 These rights remain beyond state jurisdiction. As Munoz states, “The state…can
never have a ‘compelling interest’ to regulate or infringe [these inalienable elements].”47 Further,
“the act of balancing itself assumes an authority that neither the state as a whole nor judges (as
state agents) possess.”48
Of course not every element related to free exercise was or should be outside state cognizance.
But the limits of natural rights of religious liberty are themselves natural limits, at least according
to many in the Founding Era. They have to do with natural law and its basic principles. Munoz
states the issue this way: “the Founders understood the natural right of religious liberty to be
categorical but not unbounded.”49 James Wilson exemplifies this idea in his Lectures on Law:
“that [man] has a right to exert those powers [given by nature] for the accomplishments of those
purposes, in such a manner, and on such objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct;
provided he does no injury to others; and provided some publick interests do not demand his
labours. This right is natural liberty. Every man has a sense of this right….while they [the exercise
of these rights] are not injurious to others; and…no human institution has placed them under
control of magistrates or laws…. The laws of nature are the measure and the rule; they ascertain
the limits and extent of natural liberty.”50
One can act according to one’s own inclinations as long as he or she does not violate the limits set
by natural law. Further, according to Wilson, the natural law contains two maxims: (1) that no
person should cause injury to another and (2) that lawful “engagements” (contracts) voluntarily
made ought to be fulfilled.51 Thomas Jefferson wrote that “No man has a natural right to commit
aggression on the equal rights of another.”52 Though God is the foundation of these natural laws,
they apply to all men, Christians and non-Christians. Reason and not only special revelation allows
all to “participate” in the divine natural law.53 But the natural rights one possesses do not extend
beyond the natural rights of others having the same rights. If for example, one wishes to kill
another for religious reasons (the classic example of human sacrifice), such an “expression of
liberty” is not protected by the killer’s natural rights, but has violated the natural rights of the other
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to life and has thus violated a natural law principle as well. The law of nature to do not harm has
its corollary right not to be harmed.54
Phillip Munoz argues that in state constitutions and the writings of the Founders, the right of
religious liberty and conscience, in most cases he examines, are bounded by natural law
limitations.55 But, as Munoz adds, the reading of those as natural law boundary conditions has
been challenged and defined as exemptions.56 However, Munoz’s response makes sense: “If the
free exercise provisions were exemptions, “we would expect balancing-standard provisos to
accompany free exercise texts in every relevant Founding-era declaration of rights of
constitution.”57 Moreover, according to Munoz, “Strictly speaking, boundary provisos were not
needed, because natural rights are, by nature, bounded.”58 In summary, religious freedom rights
were natural rights, possessed by all humans at birth, and inalienable. They are bounded only by
natural law itself, translated as duty not to interfere with others’ like rights and cause harm as a
result. The limits on rights then were categorical limits on state authority. They were (are) “strict
and absolute limits…. Religious liberty is special because it places a categorical limit on
governmental sovereignty.”59
This is an originalist argument against the balancing-exemption test adopted by the current
American courts. I have only touched on the positive case, as well as implied it in the originalist
analysis above. IN the following section, I will examine how the United States courts, especially
the Supreme Court, has treated the right of religious liberty.
What Have the Courts Done with the Founders?
The first case addressing religious freedom at the national level did not use a balancing test (or
what I would call a utilitarian calculus). In Reynolds v. United States (1879) the Supreme Court
held that a Mormon practicing polygamy could not challenge Federal anti-bigamy laws by
invoking his religious freedom rights. The reasoning of the court began by stating the fundamental
nature of the free exercise right. Moreover, the polygamist was free to believe that polygamy was
ordained by God. In fact, the court wrote that Reynolds’ belief was a sincerely held central tenet
of the Mormon religion. However, Free Exercise rights are not unlimited. In this case, the court
reasoned that the federal government cannot interfere with a person’s religious beliefs, except
when a religious practice violates certain notions of health, safety, and morality — police powers.60
The Supreme Court opinion read in part,
“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. Polygamy has always
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,… So here, as a law of the
organization of society,…it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man
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excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious beliefs? To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.61
The court implemented a fairly straightforward approach. Was religion involved here? The court
answered in the affirmative. Reynolds had argued that both his beliefs and practice of polygamy
were protected by the First Amendment because they constituted religion under the definition
ascribed to the Free Exercise Clause. That right being a given, what then were its limits? Its limits
here were the accepted moral beliefs about practices that were embodied in law. It was not whether
the law had a better claim than the religious practice. That is utilitarianism, a calculus whereby
the court “measures” the interest of the state against the interest of free exercise practices. Rather
the decision turned on whether the law itself was legitimate as a support for morals and/or a stable
society. Of course, one might argue that that approach leaves much leeway for state intervention,
and it did, except that such leeway could be substantially reduced if the state’s burden to show the
objectively the connection of laws to moral behavior is strict. I would argue that the basis of
societal morality ought to be rooted not in emotivism or relativism, or in some claim of opposing
group rights, but in a natural law or modified divine command theory. I am speculating a bit, but
I suggest that the Reynolds was in fact rooted in a traditional Judeo-Christian moral code. In
arguing for some modified version of Reynolds, I am making a bold claim and one that is
potentially unattainable. But I submit that the present balancing test is no better, and in fact, worse
in some cases, and is highly dependent on the changing make-up of the Supreme Court as well as
the idiosyncratic conceptions of the term “compelling interest” applied in such cases. I also content
that the current balancing or utilitarian test tends to allow the devaluation of religion while overvaluing the state’s interest.62 A modified Reynolds test would give stability to the valuation of
religion in its fundamental importance and would also move away from allowing governments to
attach their own value to their laws and policies.
One representative instance of the current balancing method is Sherbert v. Verner (1963). The
issue in that case concerned an unemployed individual’s inability to take a job because of her
alleged religious scruples regarding working on Saturdays. The employment compensation
department of South Carolina required her to accept offered employment as a condition for
benefits. She argued her Free Exercise rights had been violated. The United States Supreme Court
opinion began by citing Reynolds and then stated
“If, therefore. the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's
constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents
no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental
burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate….63
For the first time, the court applied a balancing test, weighing the interest in Free Exercise by the
individual against the “compelling interest” of the state. This is nothing more than a utilitarian
calculus, with the difference that there are no mathematical calculations. Rather the court applies
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a sort of ordinal analysis. The result in this case was a victory for the claimant. The costs to her
from the state regulations were articulated by the court:
We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the
free exercise of appellant's religion. We think it is clear that it does. In a sense the consequences
of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of
welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal
sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only the beginning, not the
end, of our inquiry.5 For '(i)f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or
all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.' Braunfeld v. Brown,
supra, 366 U.S., at 607, 81 S.Ct., at 1148. Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared
ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her
to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.64
It appears that in this case, the Free Exercise interest was given a great deal of weight, even though
the “burden” was said to be “indirect.” The went on to address the state’s interest:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation,' Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323, 89 L.Ed. 430. No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the
present case. The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims
by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute
the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary
Saturday work.65
The two interests are compared ordinally (which one is greater than the other) and the Free
Exercise interest comes out ahead. But there is no necessary reason it should, even with a set of
similar facts. The Free Exercise interest might well have been given less weight and arguably it
was given the weight it was simply because of the general cultural context of that time period and
the vestigial respect for religion. Moreover, the interests of the state might have been given greater
weight except for the generally less deference to government at the time. Since the New Deal we
have seen in the United States a much greater advocacy for state action as well as a much higher
deference to administrative agencies (Chevron deference for example), in political thought,
legislative and executive action, and judicial decisions. At the same time, we see arguably a
decline in religious deference and an accompanying secularization. These factors have not
bypassed courts.66 Since the 1930s American jurisprudence has slowly been moving from both an
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originalist orientation (with somewhat of a renaissance in recent years) as well as a view of
religious freedom as a first priority right as over against the state.
Brief Philosophical Argument
The foundation of my (and others’) argument is that religious liberty has been grounded on one
of two basic moral philosophical systems: utilitarianism and some form of non-utilitarianism. The
Founders, I argue, based their right on a non-utilitarian moral philosophy of natural law. Later
theorists might perhaps have chosen different non-utilitarian grounds, Kantian deontology or even
a modified Divine Command Theory. As I have also shown, modern American courts have used
a utilitarian approach in essence, though not a pure theory. This difference creates the necessity
of a choice related to whether we wish to base moral and legal theory and practice on an unstable
foundation, as utilitarianism is, or a more stable, but also less accepted stable approach.
Natural law, from which natural rights are derived, has a long pedigree, dating in its more
secular form to ancient times. It gained prominence in the work of Thomas Aquinas (13th century),
who borrowed much from Aristotle and synthesized it with Christian thought. From Aquinas to
the eighteenth century, natural law and natural rights theories remained virtually unchanged.67
Utilitarianism, a form of consequentialism, though it had existed in some form throughout the
centuries, was developed more explicitly by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in the late
eighteenth century and early to mid-nineteenth century. Utilitarianism is not rooted in any
religious tradition, but does, according to Bentham, is grounded in human nature. As Bentham
wrote,
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It
is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine wht we shall do. On the
one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened
to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make
to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may
pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle
of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of
which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to
question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of
light.68
Utilitarianism (at least act utilitarianism) seeks no particular outcome a priori, but its adherents
have believed (with modifications since Bentham69) that the moral or legal-political choice to be
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made in each situation depends on the pain-pleasure calculus or happiness remainder. Another,
somewhat cruder way to describe utilitarianism is as a cost-benefit calculus. It is utilitarianism
that I argue has been more or less adopted by the American courts, not only as applied to religious
freedom cases, but many other types of rights-based cases.
Utilitarianism gradually displaced natural rights theory (and its associated social contract
theory) in the nineteenth century, as philosophers and jurists sought a more palatable method for
deciding legal issues. Why it displaced natural rights theory is not as clear. Perhaps it was partially
due to a secularizing influence, though the secularization theory has been challenged by those who
believe (rightly in part) that what we now call secularization is really just new forms of
“religion.”70 At any rate, both social contract theory and natural rights theory had been more or
less rejected until the middle of the twentieth century.71 Natural rights theory did survive in the
Catholic tradition and it was from there that it has experienced a relative renaissance in recent
decades, especially in areas related to certain ethical and legal issues touching in religion.72 Social
contract theory saw its “resurrection” with the publication of John Rawls’ book, A Theory of
Jutsice in 1971.73 Thought it is possible to explicate a social contract theory with a utilitarian
theory, scholars, such as Phillip Munoz in this paper, have combined social contract theory with
natural rights theory, as he (and I) believe was the Founders’ approach. The American Founders
in fact would have been virtually unfamiliar with utilitarianism in any formal sense, and even if
they had, would likely not have been attracted to it.
Conclusion
It is here where I must in brief form explain my own suggested legal test for religious liberty
cases. This is by no means the last word. But I am convinced the time has come to begin to think
about a new (or “old”) approach to judicial decision-making in the area of religious liberty. I will
begin by rejecting for the most part the balancing-utilitarian approach. As I stated earlier this
approach has led to arbitrariness in case law. It is first dependent on the subjective value attributed
to religious liberty versus the state. In fact, it seems to function at the Supreme Court level as a
classic case of utilitarian decision calculus regarding a community decision. Each justice
informally calculates his or her cost-benefit outcome for each entity choice—state and
individual—and then collectively the court arrives at the ”sum” of all costs and benefits through
voting—a crude and sometimes skewed approach to utilitarian decisions. It is then the highest net
value of one over the other competing values that determines the legal decision. Outcomes can
change between and among cases even with the stable set of judges, and certainly as the court
changes sitting judges over time. Religious liberty becomes uncertain and arbitrary. Moreover,
in a more secular environment as time passes, the value of religious liberty may well decline in the
eyes of judges, although I cannot say that with certainty.
But it does little good merely to criticize one method without some idea, though tentativer, of
a replacement. I propose a method rooted in Phillip Munoz’s originalist analysis. In other words,
I am proposing a return to what I believe was the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.
70

See Peter Harrison, editor, Secularization.
See Mark Hulliung, The Social Contract Theory in America: From the Revolution to the Present Age. University
Press of Kansas, 2007. Many scholars have traced the decline of natural rights and natural law theory, including in
America. On its use, see Benjamin F. Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law: A Study in the History of
Political Thought. Routledge (2017 reprint).
72
The work of Robert P. George, among others, comes to mind. But see also John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights, Second edition. Oxford University, 2011.
73
Harvard University, 1971.
71

In a very general way, I would begin in any specific case, by defining whether what is being
asserted as a free exercise right is in fact religion. This does not require the courts to become
theologians, only that they develop a framework for defining what a religion is—not the truth or
falsity of its content. This definition would include all traditional religions as well as
encompassing non-traditional religions, likely including atheism.
Religion in the US Constitution is a primary right, a preferred right, if not a natural right in
modern thought. So even though traditional natural rights theory may not be recognized by many
jurists, the right of free exercise of religion is still embedded in the American social contract as
fundamental law, acting as a proxy natural right.74 Moreover, human rights law recognizes
freedom of religious belief and practice as fundamental.75
If the activity alleged as free exercise is connected to religion, then the court proceeds determine
whether the law or regulation issued by the state is equivalent to a natural law limiting a natural
right. This can be a more difficult exercise for any court, but if the court can in some sense rely
on what are fundamental laws and rights as counterweights, it will to some extent avoid simply
extending state power because it believes states need or deserve more authority. It helps to
understand that religious freedom must be given a high value—and for many good reasons, even
if one is not a believer. The “harm principle” might serve as one criterion, though harm can be
defined too broadly. Again, a court must hue to a more traditional and fixed meaning for harm
and not diverge into extreme subjectivity.
If the harm is legitimate and is recognized as such, the assertion of religious freedom in the
action itself cannot be accepted. But if the harm alleged is not in the category of objective harm,
the freedom of religious exercise must be granted. It is a categorical approach we are suggesting—
categories of religion versus non-religion versus categories of harm versus no-harm. One should
not infringe the other. I do not weigh each, but define each and fix heir values based on a more
objective measure.

74

See Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. University of Nebraska, 1987, for the
distinction between fundamental laws of a constitution and ordinary law in legislative decision-making.
75
See United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

